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CALL OUT THE RESERVES: A CHANGE IN PARADIGM FOR THE ARMY'S RESERVE COMPONENTS
Reserve -a military force withheld from action for later decisive use. -Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary
Today's Army reserve component (RC) is truly a committed force. In 2002, over 180,000 soldiers were deployed in over 80 countries; of those more than 25,000 were citizen-soldiers on active duty. 1, 2, 3 In the Army, where approximately 54 percent of the force structure resides within the RC, members of the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the US Army Reserve (USAR) realize that they are no longer the part-timers they envisioned when they signed up for one weekend a month and two weeks a year. 4, 5, 6 Indeed, RC annual duty days increased thirteen fold since 1989, and this phenomenon occurred as the active army decreased in size and the overall personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO) increased significantly. 7, 8, 9, 10 This increased tempo has been cause for concern. While some leaders, such as Major
General George Keefe, Adjutant General, Massachusetts National Guard, recognized that the active component (AC) cannot "keep up," others such as Senator Max Cleland (D-GA), chairman of the Senate armed services personnel subcommittee, warned, "It's not wise to commit the reserves in a wartime capacity for a long period of time." 11, 12 The reason for this concern is not that citizen-soldiers are being deployed, it is the fact that they are being deployed for non-combat and open-ended missions. 13 Traditionally, Americans joined the RC in the belief that they would mobilize for "World War III," or other national emergency. 14 In the past decade the nature of war has changed, military operations other than war (MOOTW) have routinely necessitated the deployment of thousands of citizen-soldiers around the world for extended periods of time. 15, 16 None of these deployments, with the possible exception of the Gulf War, met the expectation of a "World War III." 17 Even the war on terrorism fails to meet those expectations, as no one knows what victory will look like or when it might occur.
The apprehension that many express covers a range of issues. First, many reservists believe they belong to a reserve force, that is, one "withheld from action for later decisive use."
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Few understand what is decisive about, for example, standing in the Sinai desert as part of the Multinational Force and Observer element. A quick review of the missions that the RC has been called to perform in recent years shows this trend of using the RC to provide relief for the AC, which is on the verge of being overextended and would therefore be unable to perform its primary mission of warfighting. 19 Declining morale is another issue facing the AC. Back-to-back deployments are adversely affecting morale and retention in the active force.
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Second, several observers have pointed to the existing and potential morale problems that face an overused RC force. 21 Potential losses in income, family separation, and unemployment are significant concerns that face many mobilized citizen-soldiers. 22 Additionally, many former members of the AC joined the RC because they wanted to pursue other interests full-time, but still be part of the Army. Repetitious mobilizations defeat those goals and result in them allowing their term of service to expire.
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Third is the concern that these morale problems will result in "breaking" the force, that is, citizen-soldiers will not seek to extend their terms of service and recruiting will not keep up with the losses. 24, 25, 26 Although this has not yet occurred, most experts agree that it is only a matter of time.
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Fourth, many worry that the AC is not big enough to accomplish all of its assigned missions and there exists the potential for overextension. If the AC were involved in too many MOOTW when a regional conflict erupted, units would have to redeploy to the conflict, leaving contingency operations unfinished.
29
The issue then, and the purpose of this paper, is to suggest a way for the Army to best provide a seamless force capable of meeting the needs of the nation.
BACKGROUND
In 1970, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird announced the "Total Force" policy, which directed the armed services to rely more heavily upon the RC. 30 Shortly after the end of the Vietnam War, then Chief of Staff of the Army General Creighton Abrams directed that a significant portion of the Army's force structure be moved out of the AC and into the RC. 31 This was done primarily to ensure that the Army never again went to war without calling upon "the spirit of the American people." 32 The result was a force with a RC that focused on providing a strategic capability consisting primarily of heavy forces (i.e., armor and mechanized infantry).
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Since that time the RC has participated in virtually every major military operation to include Grenada, Panama, the Gulf War, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. While the RC's performance has written a new chapter in the innovative employment of RC forces, there has been a crosscurrent of antagonism between the AC and RC. This culminated with the 48 th Brigade's infamous rotation to the National Training Center (NTC) in 1991. 34 The rotation was ordered as part of the 48 th Brigade's post-mobilization training prior to deployment for the Gulf War, this despite the brigade's "passing marks" during a similar rotation only four months earlier. 35 In what became the longest training cycle ever conducted at the NTC, the 48 th became "certified" for deployment on 28 February 1991, 91 days after mobilization and one day after the ground war ended. The result of this experience exacerbated the lack of trust between the two components, in particular the AC and the ARNG. 36, 37 The AC leaders believed that the train-up was an example of how the ARNG could not live up to its responsibilities, while ARNG officers accused the AC of changing the standards. This continued lack of trust casts a pall over the relationship between AC and RC leaders. 38 After observing both AC and RC officers it is relatively apparent that many AC officers have a better understanding and higher level of acceptance of working in the joint operational arena than with "The Army." 39 Likewise, RC officers are so concerned about maintaining the relevance of their organization that they often try to force their component to be "more like the AC than the AC." Because of a lack of understanding, many AC officers do not believe that the RC is up to the task of fighting and winning the nation's wars, and many RC officers believe that their AC counterparts want to eliminate their component at the earliest opportunity.
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Despite this friction, after the Gulf War, the Department of Defense (DoD) continued the migration of force structure to the RC. This included significant numbers of combat support and service support units. 42 The motivation for this transfer of force structure had changed. In addition to ensuring public support should we go to war again, the new impetus was on saving money. 43 Because the RC consumes resources only for part-time training or when mobilized, they use about 8 percent of the DoD budget. 44 As a result of attempting to realize a "peace dividend" the AC saw its structure reduced by more than 36 percent and the Army was forced to increase its reliance on the RC. 45 Even with the RC's increased PERSTEMPO, the costs of being mobilized on active duty were considerably less than that of maintaining those same units in the AC force structure full-time. 46 In fact the RC is currently providing 12 to 13 million mandays per year, equivalent to the addition of two AC divisions.
47
To fully appreciate the changes that took place in the force between the end of the Cold
War and the present one should look at the change in the number of divisions and separate Prior to 1990 the Army was a force designed to fight against the Soviet Union. Although the Soviet Union no longer exists, the Army must remain prepared to fight a "world class" opponent in a global conventional war scenario. More likely though is the need for the application of military force at lower levels of intensity, as described by the spectrum of military operations (see Figure 1 ). So the question becomes, if we must have a campaign quality force capable of fighting and winning the nation's wars in a global sense, can that same force accomplish the other missions in the spectrum? In other words, if we are training and preparing for a global war, are we also preparing for lower intensity responsibilities? Once the answer to these questions is determined the subsequent thought is for the mixture of force structure between the AC and RC. While the answer to the first question will not be forthcoming in this paper, a way to determine a response to the second issue will be offered.
FIGURE 1. THE SPECTRUM OF MILITARY OPERATIONS
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With the four tasks in mind, that is, knowing what the Army must be capable of doing, it would be useful to have a list of conditions that could be applied in order to determine which component is most appropriate for a particular mission. Similarly, such a list would provide
information as to what a unit should look like and therefore influence force structure decisions.
The ASD/RA has created such a list. The ASD/RA identified four criteria for evaluating the choice of component for a particular mission. These conditions were tempo, predictability, timing, and availability. These criteria are not in any particular order, nor does one condition trump any of the others. The selection of a component is based upon the mission at hand and the circumstances that surround the accomplishment of that mission. § Tempo -recognizes the frequency and duration of a mission. As might be expected, the AC is probably best suited for missions that are performed 365 days a year, while RC forces can support missions that are less than "full-time". § Predictability -acknowledges that the more certain one is about a mission, the easier it is to plan and train for. Short-notice crises do not allow sufficient time for the mobilization and training of RC forces, while those actions that are more long-term might allow for the AC to transfer command and control to the RC. § Timing -identifies when forces are required in an area of operations. If an immediate response is required the AC is usually the force of choice, but sporadic or irregular missions may be more appropriate for the RC. § Availability -recognizes when a unit, or individual, can be ready to perform a mission.
Those missions requiring a high state of readiness may be best suited for the AC. In some situations the RC may be more suitable because experience, training, and time available until deployment. Before considering the design of the total force, thought should be given to the geopolitical environment. Since there are never enough assets, the national leadership must speculate and indeed predict the types and numbers of missions that must be conducted so that the Army can focus it's training and resources to ensure success.
These predictions along with assignment of lead responsibility make it possible to design a total force. By evaluating each mission's conditions the size and number of forces required should become obvious. Comparing these results to the national leadership's predictions provides a total force package to meet the needs of the nation.
WHAT ARE THE CONSEQUENCES OF CHANGE?
There are many consequences to restructuring the force. These range from the subjective "hurt feelings" when colors are cased and units inactivated to the objective, such as mission failure should the wrong decisions be made. Additionally, there are legislative constraints and restraints that must be addressed under any course of action that might be adopted. More specifically there are several areas of disquiet. These concerns include resourcing, personnel caps, retraining time required when converting units, and the sensitivities of Army leaders to the "tinkering" that would go on within the their component. Of overriding concern is the ability of the Army to meet the needs of the nation. If it cannot, it is irrelevant whose feelings are hurt, as the nation as a whole would suffer.
CAN WE MAKE A SEAMLESS ARMY?
The final consideration is the goal of a seamless Army. This worthwhile aim would ensure that all soldiers, no matter the component, would be trained to accomplish their mission, would know and understand their responsibilities, and would be trusted to complete their assigned tasks. The major issue is trust. Although both components consist of professionals who truly want to provide the best Army possible, without trust a true "seamless" Army will never happen.
Any restructuring proposals must take this environment into account and seek ways to establish trust and build camaraderie.
DISCUSSION
Based upon the information cited above, it is not surprising that there have been numerous suggestions as to how to change the Army to meet the requirements of a new century. These suggestions seek to solve the problems in a number of unique ways and have included such ideas as assigning the ARNG with the primary responsibility for homeland security; affects the decision-making process regarding force structure, roles, and missions assigned to each component.
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ASSUMPTIONS § The American people are unable, and unwilling, to resource an AC large enough to accomplish all the tasks that could potentially be assigned to the Army.
87 § The ARNG will maintain its political base and remain a major component of the Army.
88,89 § Many RC leaders to not believe that AC leaders consider the RC a viable and useful part of the Army.
90 § While the RC does not maintain the same level of day-to-day readiness as the AC, it can achieve those identical levels within a relatively short time given the proper resources.
91 § Reserve Component citizen-soldiers and officers are dedicated to their units, the Army, and the nation to the same degree as AC soldiers and officers.
92 § Governors will want to retain the ability to use their ARNG to meet the requirements for disasters, civil disturbance, and homeland security.
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Coupled with the conditions identified above (i.e., Army responsibilities and ASD/RA criteria) these facts and assumptions can be used to establish an outline for assessing the Army's organization. This assessment's goals would be to ensure that not only can the Army fight and win the nation's wars, but also meet the requirements for those events that are something less than war, that is, MOOTW.
To determine the required force, and ultimately determine the structure of the Army, one must evaluate each mission on the spectrum of military operations. However, following the ASD/RA suggested conditions leads to some unusual conclusions. For example, the ASD/RA recommended that those missions performed 365 days a year might best be suited for the AC based upon tempo, defined as frequency and duration. This would lead one to conclude that noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), raids, and strikes would be prime candidates for assignment to the RC, since they are not events that last over an extended period of time and occur infrequently. However, given the political implications of using the RC and the readiness requirements for missions such as these, few would support the assignment of a NEO mission to the RC. The evaluation of required force should go much deeper and be more comprehensive than the conditions suggested by the ASD/RA. The assessment therefore, should include a prediction of how quickly forces must arrive in the area of operations, the period of time those forces will perform their mission, the likelihood of combat operations, the strategic consequences of US military force involvement, the level of readiness required of those forces, and the risk to those forces during deployment and while performing their assigned mission.
What follows is offered as a more inclusive way of evaluating the conditions of a mission to ensure the assignment of the best force for the job. This tool, the AC/RC algorithm, allows the decision maker to compare and contrast seven conditions that define a mission's environment, availability, duration, intensity, political implications, predictability, readiness, and risk.
NEW CRITERIA FOR CONSIDERATION
Availability
This term defines the time required before a unit, or individual, is available in the area of operations. 94 Availability takes into account the time required for mobilization and training (if required) and deployment. Missions that require immediate availability, such as a NEO, raid, or strike, would probably lead one to select the AC as the force of choice. Similarly, missions such as peacekeeping operations or security assistance, which might allow some lead-time for mobilization and deployment, suggest the employment of RC forces.
The immediate requirement for forces to accomplish what will eventually become a longterm involvement requires an analysis of the situation. It may be necessary to employ the AC for the initial stages of an operation, allowing for the mobilization of the RC. The condition of availability must be compared to the duration of the mission in order to provide an accurate assessment.
Duration
The anticipated length of an operation is critical to the determination of the force of choice.
The longer a mission the more probable it will become routine or cyclical, allowing for the rotation of forces. While it is not always possible, or desired, to announce the length of a mission, it is necessary to forecast its duration for a number of reasons. These include readiness concerns, logistical issues, and the morale and espirit of the deployed forces. If the mission is of sufficient duration to allow for the rotation of forces, it becomes a candidate for employment of the RC, however sufficient time must be allowed for mobilization and any training requirements that must be completed. An example of this transition has taken place in Bosnia and Kosovo as AC forces have yielded responsibility for command and the provision of soldiers to the RC.
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The duration of a mission is of concern for AC forces as their readiness for combat operations can be adversely affected. Most MOOTW missions do not allow assigned units to maintain their proficiency in critical warfighting tasks. 97, 98, 99 Assignment of RC forces to these long-term operations allows the AC to retrain, refit, and retain the ability to wage war.
Intensity
Intensity is the probability of the conduct of military maneuvers usually associated with conventional war. The higher the intensity the higher the required state of readiness for deployed units. Those operations, in which high intensity operations are expected, such as raids and strikes would generally be assigned to AC forces, particularly after considering the other variables. Likewise, low intensity operations, such as humanitarian assistance or militaryto-military contact could be considered for assignment to the RC.
The analysis of intensity is one of accepting risk. In an operation such as humanitarian assistance the expectation of high intensity conflict is low. However, as the events of 1993 in Mogadishu, Somalia show, the situation can change rapidly. 
Political Implications
The affect of political issues and concerns cannot be underestimated when considering the employment of the RC. First, there is the issue of employing the RC to call up "the spirit of the American people." In the past, when the United States mobilized it's RC it was a signal to the American people as well as other nations that America was going to war. This may no longer be the case.
Second, while calling up the reserves may not carry the "go to war" message any longer, it can still be interpreted as an indication of the anticipated seriousness and duration of an operation. The nation's political leadership might want to portray a deployment as a short-term event, but mobilizing the RC would send a contradictory signal. This proved true at the beginning of the Bosnian peace operation when the American public was told that the troops would be home within a year. 106 Mobilization of the RC would have challenged that message.
Third, the size of the Army is a political football that has been argued over on a recurring basis. 107 Many would argue that the AC should be expanded to account for the increased PERSTEMPO, others would point to the cost savings of the RC. 108 The bottom-line of this argument is that the current political climate is such that an increase in the size of the AC is doubtful. 109, 110 Unless a global crisis occurs, the political will is unlikely to support an increase in the size of the AC. The ability to predict what will happen on the world stage then becomes significant.
Predictability
Understanding how the environment will affect the mission is the key reason for predictability's addition to the list of evaluation criteria. Issues such as the threat, duration, or political implications can have significant consequences on the decision-making process for determining the assignment of forces. The more routine an operation, the more flexibility there is for scheduling units on a rotational basis. The more predictable, the more likely it is that citizen-soldiers can perform that mission. Predictability can be inserted into most long-term MOOTW by establishing a schedule so that RC units rotate into and out of the area of operations. This would require sufficient units within the RC to ensure that citizen-soldiers would not be mobilized again for at least three to four years.
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Simply knowing when or where a crisis might occur is only part of the solution. Rotating soldiers and units might fulfill the need to return citizen-soldiers to their civilian employers, but the risk associated with their short time on station may have other, more devastating consequences. The force sent to address the situation must be trained and able to accomplish the mission.
Readiness
Typically readiness is a measure of a unit's ability to perform wartime tasks. But proficiency at such missions as attack and defend may not be the critical skill sets required for MOOTW. But, what must be remembered is that MOOTW are highly volatile missions with the situation changing from one minute to the next. 112 The deployed force must have the capability to accomplish the assigned mission and be prepared to conduct operations that verge on, or become, conventional warfare.
While an initial assessment of a mission might lead one to recommend that the RC be assigned, it may be necessary to send the AC initially, as they have a higher level of readiness.
The RC can then mobilize, train, and eventually replace the AC forces. As an example, this is already being done in Bosnia.
113,114
Risk
Risk is an assessment of the dangers involved when undertaking a mission. Risk is always present, but leaders attempt to minimize it as much as possible through careful planning.
The application of these criteria -availability, duration, intensity, predictability, political implications, and readiness introduce a level of risk that must be guarded against. Specifically, the risk is that of assigning the wrong force to a mission. This risk is double-edged in that over reliance on the AC may result in a situation where either they are not available when needed for a major conflict, or their readiness has been degraded, due to continuous MOOTW.
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Likewise, assignment of an inadequately trained RC force to a MOOTW that suddenly becomes high intensity conflict could prove disastrous.
Analysis
The conditions listed above are by no means exhaustive, and undoubtedly others could justify the addition of different criteria. What is important is the provision of a framework for the analysis and determination of forces for assignment to various missions that occur along the spectrum of military operations. There are other criteria that could be applied to the decisionmaking process, such as budgetary limitations, manpower caps, and other legislative constraints, however an in depth analysis of their impact is beyond the scope of this paper.
It is important that none of these conditions be considered in a vacuum. They interrelate with each other to form a complete picture of the situation. A simple algorithm, such as that shown in Figure 2 could be used to assess a mission and assign responsibility. By comparing each condition to the mission and expected environment a determination of the component of choice becomes apparent.
Condition Component
Availability AC A few examples can demonstrate the utility of this process. Suppose a mission requires the urgent presence (immediate availability) of well-trained (high readiness) military forces, such as a strike or raid. This situation could result in the assignment of an AC force. Similarly, if the mission required only the presence of forces (low intensity), and was of long duration, such as a peacekeeping operation, the RC might be the component of choice. These are simplistic
RC
examples that serve to demonstrate the concept of applying the algorithm. Another useful illustration is the current situation in Bosnia and Kosovo. A decision was made that led to the replacement of AC forces by the RC.
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The RC has assumed responsibility for missions that do not require immediate availability and are of long duration and low intensity. Likewise, AC forces previously performing these peacekeeping duties have been released to prepare for other missions requiring immediate availability, shorter duration, and higher intensity. Once again, though some would criticize the simplicity of this approach, the process provides another tool for the decision maker, who ultimately must apply his or her knowledge and experience in making the determination of which component to assign a particular mission.
SUMMARY
Using these new criteria and the facts and assumptions presented earlier, a number of venues become available for the better integration of the Army's components. By establishing a tool that everyone uses and understands a line of communication is opened that permits the professional discussion of the issues surrounding the roles of the RC, and ultimately how they are organized.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The identification of forces for assignment to a particular mission can be viewed as a
puzzle. There are a number of variables that go into the solution of this puzzle, type of mission, political environment, required resources, and the conditions identified above. A comparison of these criteria with the information available about a proposed mission provides the decision maker with a tool that facilitates a structured decision-making process.
An earlier discussion identified five criteria for change. The purpose of this research, and the development of the AC/RC algorithm, was to address those questions. An evaluation of those criteria, with respect to the algorithm is appropriate. Second, what must the Army be able to do? The use of the algorithm provides a means for a conscientious decision-making process that takes into account seven variables that impact on the Army's ability to accomplish it's assigned missions. While risk is always a significant factor in the assignment of forces, the algorithm is a way to minimize that risk. The concerns of overextending the AC and underutilizing the RC are real, and the impact on readiness of either of these two mistakes is immeasurable. By carefully considering the options available and the long-term impact on the force, the algorithm provides a method for minimizing risk and ensuring that the Army can accomplish the tasks set forth by the Secretary of Defense.
Third, are there any criteria that could be used to identify the force of choice (AC or RC)?
Could these criteria assist with the design of the total force? The AC/RC algorithm lays the groundwork for an analysis of the force based upon the considerations and decisions of the senior leadership of the Army. Using the criteria availability, duration, intensity, predictability, political implications, readiness, and risk suggests a method for calculating the size and structure of the force. For example, let us suppose that the national leadership has decided that, for planning purposes, the Army must be capable of performing two long-term peacekeeping missions. By establishing predictability, each mission requires a six-month deployment, plus two months of training prior to deployment. Assume also that these missions 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The process of researching this paper generated a number of possible directions for further investigation. First would be a study of the composition of the RC. Why does the ARNG 
GLOSSARY
The Army -a "total force" consisting of the active Army, the Army National Guard (ARNG), the US Army Reserve (USAR), and Department of the Army civilians. The ARNG and the USAR are also elements of the reserve components (RC) of the Army (see below).
Citizen-soldier -a term for reservists that emphasizes the fact that they are part-time soldiers prepared to serve in time of national emergency or disaster. Citizen-soldiers, also known as M-day soldiers, typically perform military training one weekend a month and two weeks a year.
Deployed -for the purpose of this paper deployed and mobilized imply that citizensoldiers have been called to duty, either state or federal active duty, and sent to conduct a mission. While deployed and mobilized are not synonymous, for the purposes of this paper they were used to convey the concept of "calling out the Guard."
Homeland Security (HLS) -"covers all actions taken to safeguard American lives and property at home." 
